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Abstract 
Despite the widespread use of disappearances as a central tool of terror in recent decades, 
little is known about the emergence of the phenomenon or its underlying rationale. We 
argue that growing international accountability norms, coupled with the improved quality 
of reporting human rights abuses, paradoxically reshaped the repressive strategies of 
certain regimes and pushed them to deploy more clandestine and extrajudicial forms of 
repression, predominantly disappearances. We also explore the timing of disappearances; 
when a state decides to deploy a particular instrument of terror can greatly benefit our 
understanding of why it was used. We show repressive regimes tend to use 
disappearances in the first period after a coup, taking advantage of the general confusion 
and opacity to secure strategic benefits and protect the regime from external scrutiny and 
future accountability. Our findings contribute to the growing literature on human rights 
and political repression by highlighting an ‘unintended consequence’ of international 
accountability norms: repressive regimes turn to clandestine crimes.  
 
 
Keywords: human rights, enforced disappearances, missing persons, international 
accountability norms, state repression, unintended consequences. 
 
Introduction 
According to a recent report of the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, 91 states face the problem of enforced disappearances (United Nations, 
2017). By abducting, secretly executing, and hiding the remains of their victims, 
perpetrators have three main aims. First, and most obviously, they want to eliminate real 
or perceived enemies. Second, they seek to spread a unique form of terror, trapping the 
affected families in a state of ‘ambiguous loss’ and paralyzing the broader society (Boss, 
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2006). Third, by hiding the body and concealing the crime, they hope to deny its 
commission and avoid the consequent criminal charges.  
In what follows, we highlight the gaps in the relevant literature and articulate our 
contribution. Second, we explore the historical, ideational and normative causes of 
disappearances. We show how the ‘justice cascade’ (Sikkink, 2011) of the late 20th 
century, coupled with the improved quality of reporting human rights abuses, 
paradoxically reshaped the repressive strategies of certain states, pushing them to deploy 
more clandestine forms of repression, such as disappearances. Third, we shed light on the 
rationale behind the timing of disappearances by drawing on the comparative experience 
of Greece and two of the most prominent cases in Latin America, Chile and Argentina, as 
‘crucial cases’ (Eckstein, 2000). Finally, we conclude by discussing the unforeseen 
impact of post-WWII international accountability norms on shaping the repertoire of 
political repression. We show how concerns over future accountability ‘pushed’ 
authoritarian leaders to deploy novel extrajudicial and clandestine forms of repression, 
like disappearances. 
 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Gaps in the Literature on Political Violence & State 
Repression 
A number of accounts engage explicitly with the problem of enforced disappearances and 
provide detailed analyses of various aspects of the crime, including the enduring trauma 
of the relatives (Sant Cassia, 2005), or the mobilization of the relatives, including the 
well-known case of the Mothers and Grandmothers in Argentina (Arditti, 1999). Others 
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offer a systematic analysis of the historical, social and political conditions (Robben, 
2005; Brysk, 1994). Yet most are based on ethnographic research into a single or a 
couple of countries, making no attempt to identify the historical and ideational factors 
that enabled the crime to be diffused more widely. 
Legal scholars have paid particular attention to the crime of enforced 
disappearances (Kyriakou, 2012; Scovazzi and Citroni, 2007). However, most legal 
analyses fall into two categories: either they simply describe the evolution of the legal 
framework, or they assess the effectiveness of states in prosecuting perpetrators. 
Commencing from a deontological standpoint, most focus on the duty to punish, failing 
to explore the reverse side of the equation, namely how legal and normative boundaries 
affect the repertoire of violence deployed by repressive regimes. In essence, many legal 
accounts, by perceiving violence as the exception to an otherwise peaceful society, fail to 
appreciate the political rationale of repression and the strategic considerations behind the 
choice of a specific tool. Consequently, little emphasis has been placed on the impact of 
international law on the various repertoires of violence.  
Political scientists have taken significant steps towards providing robust 
theoretical explanations of the ‘logic of violence,’ accounting for the presence or absence 
of selective versus indiscriminate violence, the duration of conflict, and/or the relevance 
of institutions in times of conflict (Kalyvas, 2006). However, the objective of this fertile 
line of research is to offer a holistic theory of violence in civil wars. It does not focus on 
separate practices, in particular disappearances. To be sure, systematic attention has been 
given to which conditions cause contending groups to use specific forms of violence 
against civilians (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014; Downes, 2007), but without explaining the 
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use of disappearances and politically motivated abductions as the preferred instrument of 
violence.  
Even more importantly, this rationalist line of thought is based on the assumption 
that ‘causal structures are uniform through time’ (Sewell, 1996:263) and pays scant heed 
to variations in state repression across time. Determining why specific crimes gain 
prominence in specific historical periods and wane in others is analytically significant, 
but existing research on political violence has failed to provide a convincing explanation 
of why the crime of disappearances began to be used in a systematic way at a particular 
historical juncture (1960s and 1970s). With some exceptions (Ron, 1997; Fariss and 
Schnakenberg, 2014), few have asked how external influences may shape domestic 
repertoires of political violence.  
In line with other authors, we argue states choose among different methods of 
repression after calculating the costs and benefits of each. But the rationale behind the 
choice of one or several of these tools by different countries and at different moments in 
time has only recently sparked critical interest. Some analysts say repressive policy tools 
are not independent; they ‘provide overlapping benefits to leaders’ and ‘affect the costs 
of other repressive policies’ (Fariss and Schnakenberg, 2014:1004). Others emphasize the 
‘tactical adjustments’ made by states when they face ‘naming and shaming’ 
denunciations by international actors (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Notably, ‘when a country is 
shamed for torture by the United Nations in a given year, the level of disappearances 
increases in the following year’ (DeMeritt, Conrad and Fariss, 2014: 20-22). This finding 
is not particularly surprising, as ‘disappearing individuals after they have been tortured 
can make it more difficult to prove that the torture occurred’ (DeMeritt, Conrad and 
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Fariss, 2014: 9). By emphasizing the unintended consequences of international advocacy 
campaigns, such argumentation goes in the same direction as ours. However, while it 
helps explain why authoritarian regimes shift their repressive strategies and use 
disappearances at different stages during their rule, it fails to account for the historical 
context within which the crime of disappearances occur and does not explain the timing 
of certain repressive strategies.  
 
Historical, Ideational, and Normative Origins of Disappearances 
A combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors made disappearances particularly appealing 
from the 1970s onwards. Normative and international shifts pushed perpetrators away 
from more visible crimes (e.g. executions, torture) and pulled them towards extrajudicial 
and clandestine forms of repression. Of course, disappearances were not new in the 
1970s. They have always offered a strategic advantage. For example, by disappearing a 
handful of persons from one’s own community, one party could prevent collaboration 
with the ‘other’ (Kalyvas, 2006); it serves as a message to the ‘in-group’. Despite the 
strategic benefits, it was only with the broader international normative shift occurring 
after World War II that disappearances began to be used in a systematic way.1 
  More specifically, after World War II, the winning powers signed the Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
(London Charter). The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was established in 
1945 and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1946. As a result of these 
trials and the gradual development of international human rights law, the bar of legal 
accountability was raised. Certain actions that had never previously been punished were 
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now subject to criminal prosecution.2 Table 1 traces the main developments before 
Pinochet’s coup in 1973 – a watershed event in the use of enforced disappearances as a 
political tool. 
 
 
In sum, after 1945, an international human rights regime began to emerge. As 
Schmitz and Sikkink note, certain rights ‘underwent a process of progressive 
“international legalization,”’ while at the same time, ‘global efforts to strengthen 
individual criminal responsibility through the use of domestic, foreign, and international 
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courts gained growing support’ (Schmitz and Sikkink, 2012:832). This constrained the 
capacity of states and paramilitary groups to use overt violence, necessarily reshaping 
their preferred means of repression. As Sadat points out, ‘since World War II new 
variants of atrocity crimes have ravaged populations on different continents at different 
times’, including the ‘widespread or systematic disappearances in Latin America’ (Sadat, 
2013:375). 
In an interview, Stefanie Grant, head of research of Amnesty International in the 
1970s, explains how unprepared they were for this new variant of atrocity: this person 
was taken” or “we don’t know where this person is” and that was the end of the trail; the 
government said this has nothing to do with us, he or she is a missing person.’3 This 
seems to be a textbook case of unintended and/or unanticipated consequences (Merton, 
1936).4 By increasing the cost of visible forms of repression, a more attentive and 
demanding international community unwittingly gave dictators the incentive to deploy 
clandestine forms. A gradual shift from inter-state to individual criminal liability, along 
with innovations in formulations of human rights norms (Watkin, 2004), raised the bar of 
accountability and the potential (criminal, political, legitimacy) costs of violence, pushing 
those seeking power to find covert means to rid themselves of their enemies.  
As noted above, recourse to illegal detention/kidnapping is not novel. Those 
disappearing their enemies in the 1970s did not invent a new crime. However, some 
authors consider it only began to be used in a planned and systematic way in the French 
operations in the Indochina and Algeria Wars (Robin, 2005; Riegler, 2008). Leading 
members of the French army were convinced their mission was not limited to 
safeguarding the colonies for France; rather, they were fighting an ideological war to save 
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Europe and Christianity from communism and anti-colonial movements. Traditional 
counterinsurgency manuals could not address the new types of warfare; instead of clear 
lines of battle, the dividing line between civilians and ‘terrorists’ was unclear. 
Accordingly, the French military designed a novel counterinsurgency doctrine (guerre 
revolutionnaire) aiming to cut off popular support for guerrilla forces. Within this revised 
background, interrogations, torture, and psychological terror became central, not only in 
extracting information about potential collaborators, but also in deterring the broader 
population from assisting rebels. One crucial element of the new doctrine was making 
interrogations extrajudicial; another was taking the counterinsurgency out of the realm of 
the law to deter potential collaborators. 
Roger Trinquier, a French military officer, theorized the French 
counterinsurgency practices in Guerre Revolutionaire5. One of his concerns was the 
possible consequences of a public backlash: ‘A violent press campaign was unleashed, 
both in France and abroad, demanding that peacetime laws be strictly adhered to in the 
course of police operations’ (Trinquier, 1961:48). Such a backlash, he said, could have 
political consequences: ‘Certain harsh activities can easily pass for brutalities in the eyes 
of a sensitive public …. Our enemies will not fail to exploit the situation for their 
propaganda needs’ (Trinquier, 1961:57). In other words, there was a need to conceal 
political repression – but not to halt it. An estimated 3,000 persons disappeared during the 
Battle of Algiers (Riegler, 2008:57). According to informed observers, dead bodies were 
thrown from planes into the sea, a shocking prequel to practices of the Argentine military 
15 years later (Armony, 2005).  
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The clandestine repression exerted by an external force can easily be replicated by 
like-minded military regimes fighting domestic opposition. The strategy simply requires 
an efficient bureaucratic organization with abundant personnel, weapons, means of 
transport, and places to hold and torture enemies. So, on the one hand, the US army 
practiced the guerre revolutionnarie doctrine in Vietnam, while, on the other hand, Latin 
American dictatorships adapted it to fight domestic dissidents.  
The diffusion of disappearances to the South American continent has been widely 
documented. It is not a coincidence that the crime moved from the (former) French 
colonies to Latin America, where it became a systematic tool of state terror in the 1970s 
(Ryan, 2005:296). It was ideologically linked to the ‘national security doctrine’ and 
intrinsically related to state repression. In addition, members of the French military who 
had applied the doctrine in Algeria taught the manual (Guerre Revolutionnaire) at the 
School of Americas, the training ground for hundreds of military personnel in Latin 
America (Robin, 2005; Armony, 2005:311-312).6 In effect, the counterinsurgency 
doctrine designed by the French military set the stage for the ideological justification of 
contemporary disappearances. The notorious Operación Cóndor, which carried out 
thousands of disappearances in the region, clearly reflected the lessons of the French 
instructors. 
The above considerations should be put in the context of the emergence of new 
transnational human rights watchdogs and the rapid increase in the speed of media 
reporting, making certain crimes more easily detected. Since the 1970s, and especially 
after the 1980s, the global media have increasingly used human rights discourse in their 
reporting (Ron, 1997). Yet instead of deterring violence, the vigilance of mass media and 
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International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) has pushed perpetrators to 
commit more clandestine crimes – the ‘push’ factor we mentioned at the beginning of the 
section. Legitimacy, prestige, and reputation in the international system are important 
assets. Having a poor human rights record could have an adverse effect on international 
trade, economic aid, and investment. In preceding decades, there was little reason to 
‘disappear’ an enemy; the long time lag in reporting, the absence of human rights 
international trials, and the lack of external oversight enabled totalitarian regimes to use 
massive and overt forms of violence, a good example of which is the Stalinist repression. 
A sign of the changing times was the decision of the Argentine military to use 
disappearances as its primary form of repression. The Argentine military undoubtedly 
took note of the harm to the international reputation of Pinochet following public 
executions in Chile (Robben, 2005).  
  We do not suggest that all authoritarian regimes are influenced to the same extent 
by external normative influences. In fact, we argue that the tool of disappearances 
becomes more appealing than other available instruments under certain conditions. First, 
the threat of future accountability and/or international scrutiny is likely to be a key 
concern of the regime’s leaders. Totalitarian leaders and/or leaders whose power does not 
depend on external (financial or military) support will not have the same incentive to 
conceal their crimes, as their power is mainly founded on their ability to exert physical 
violence as a tool of coercion. In contrast, clandestine violence and disappearances reflect 
the need to conceal or deny the crime to avoid domestic unrest and to confound 
international scrutiny.  
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There is a second overlapping caveat: the military leaders of a regime should not 
have absolute control over the state and its population. A totalitarian regime that has 
reached a high level of control of social and political life usually deploys institutional 
forms of castigation or control rather than clandestine violence, such as disappearances. 
For example, Gulags, mass deportations, or executions proved to be effective institutional 
tools of repression to terrorize opposition and consolidate Stalinism. The institutional 
violence needs to be visible and have clear ‘ownership’ of coercion to maximize its 
legitimizing role. In contrast, disappearances are based on the effort to deny the crime.  
 
 
Research Design 
To explore the logic (and timing) of disappearances, we draw on the comparative 
experiences of Greece, Chile, and Argentina as ‘crucial cases’ (Eckstein, 2000). First, we 
take a close look at the actions of the Greek military junta (1967-1974). Despite sharing 
similar ideological, political, and strategic convictions with their Latin American 
counterparts, the Greek colonels used torture as their main tool of repression. We expect 
the time frame and the normative framework determined the selection of the repertoire of 
repression in each case. On the one hand, the Greek dictators did not expect rigorous 
international scrutiny and thus adopted crimes that in retrospect proved relatively easy to 
detect. Chile and Argentina, on the other hand, could be considered the ‘big bang’ of 
disappearances, not least because the growing awareness of international monitoring of 
human rights violations gave them a strong incentive to hide their crimes.  
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The Greek Junta: The Litmus Test of International Accountability 
 
Much like several Latin American juntas, the ostensible rationale of the military coup in 
Greece was to bolster stability in the country and to maintain the ‘Christian values’ 
which, in their view, were threatened by communism. Second, within the context of the 
Cold War, Greece was located in a strategic location in the global balance of power, so 
the US supported the regime, albeit covertly. This echoes the justification of the support 
of the US for the Latin American juntas, largely stemming from security concerns 
regarding a potential rise of communist-supported regimes at its backyard. Unlike the 
Latin American leaders, however, the Greek colonels used more ‘traditional’ and easier 
to document forms of repression, predominantly torture; there are no known cases of 
disappearances.  
To explain this outcome, we need to understand the international historical and 
normative context. As mentioned above, after the end of World War II, there was a 
cascade of international treaties and legal instruments. These became politically salient 
only in the mid-1960s, when international organizations and transnational NGOs started 
to monitor human rights violations systematically (Moyne, 2012; Sikkink, 2011). A 
growing number of studies show that the documentation of violations carried out by the 
Greek junta was a notable ‘turning point’ in the process (Keys 2012).  
To be precise, international accountability was not a concern when the Greek 
colonels were designing their repressive tools. For example, a few days after the coup, 
one of the military masterminds, Stylianos Pattakos, stressed that the Council of Europe 
‘bothered Greece no more than a mosquito on the horns of an ox’ (cited in Soriano, 
2017:357). We argue that there are two key reasons for this lack of concern about 
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international accountability or future domestic criminal proceedings. First, the realities of 
the Cold War in the mid-1960s made powerful states and international organizations 
more reluctant to openly confront useful military actors (notably the US) who could 
secure regional stability and security, even if that meant turning a blind eye to human 
rights violations. The Greek military could look at the dictators in the Mediterranean (e.g. 
Spain, Portugal) who were largely off the hook on human rights issues. Hence, they 
assumed their dictatorship would be business as usual.  
But things changed in the Greek case. By the second year of the junta’s rule, 
Amnesty International sent a team to Greece to investigate and document cases of torture. 
Records of the time reveal that the dictators were so shocked to be investigated by the 
international community that they naively allowed Amnesty International to be present 
(Keys, 2012; Pedaliu, 2016), and given previous history, they were genuinely convinced 
that the Western community would offer their unconditional support. However, as a 
result of the reports published by Amnesty International, and their ensuing inter-state 
cases, the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe condemned the Greek 
military for gross human rights violations. Faced with the very real prospect of being 
expelled from the Council of Europe, the colonels decided to withdraw the country from 
the Council of Europe in 1969 (Keys, 2012; Soriano, 2017).  
Most importantly, this international documentation of abuses was crucial in the 
trials held in the aftermath of the collapse of the regime in 1974, when more than a dozen 
officers involved in torture were prosecuted and convicted. The entrenched belief that 
accountability was off the table had led the colonels to opt for an easily detectable crime 
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(i.e. torture) as their preferred tool of repression. This belief paved the way for their 
eventual criminal conviction.  
The Greek experience is useful because it took place at a critical juncture (mid-
1960s) where international organizations and transnational NGOs started to monitor 
human rights violations, particularly cases of torture. The international outcry not only 
shocked the Greek dictators when it bore fruit, but it pushed other dictators to use less 
visible crimes, such as disappearances, and demonstrated the need to conceal the corpus 
delicti. It is not an entirely implausible counterfactual hypothesis to claim that if the 
Greek colonels had carried out their coup a few years later, they would probably have 
substituted torture with another clandestine crime, much like the Latin American military 
did with disappearances. In this, timing is everything. 
 
The Logic and Timing of Disappearances 
As the Greek case suggests, when a repressive state decides to deploy a particular 
instrument of terror may help explain why it was employed in the first place. As Charles 
Tilly argues, ‘When things happen within a sequence affects how they happen’ (Tilly, 
1984:14; emphasis in original). Placing state repression in time, that is, ‘systematically 
situating particular moments in a temporal sequence of events and processes,’ can benefit 
our grasp of complex processes (Pierson, 2004:78-79). 
 Although we point out that the tool of disappearances gained widespread 
acceptance after the lesson learned from the fate of the Greek colonels, we also argue that 
there are time restrictions on its usage. Timing goes beyond simply the decade or era to 
include the time span of a regime. Disappearances are most useful, from the repressor’s 
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perspective, when deployed in the early stages of an authoritarian regime to stabilize the 
power of the military, uproot any sources of resistance, and protect the masterminds from 
future prosecutions and external scrutiny. The repressors take advantage of the 
uncertainly and lack of transparency of the moment. Once they have undisputed control 
of the state, they are interested in consolidating their power; they try to legitimize and 
institutionalize their rule, sometimes even by co-opting the enemy (though this is more 
frequent in semi competitive autocracies than in military ones, which tend to invest more 
in power-sharing strategies with the ruling elite). In any case, continued recourse to 
clandestine violence tends to be of minimal use at this stabilizing stage.  
To explore this kind of timing, we draw on the comparative experiences of Chile 
and Argentina, two countries where disappearances were deployed on a massive scale at 
a time when the international normative framework around the crime was absent. Before 
we begin, a caveat is in order. The clandestine nature of the crime of disappearances 
makes it particularly difficult to document its mechanics or to get access to reliable data. 
However, Chile and Argentina have set up truth recovery mechanisms to document 
patterns of abuses, making it easier to study the element of timing in their particular 
cases.  
Graph 1 illustrates the temporal spread of disappearances in the two countries. 
The data are based on the final reports of the Truth Commissions. Most reports have 
underestimated the total number of disappearances; in fact, the figures indicate a wider 
trend of violence. To illuminate this point, the lines illustrate the distribution (in 
percentages) of the total number of recorded disappearances per year in each country. T 
is the year of the coup in the two countries, T+1, the first year after the coup, etc. As the 
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graph shows, in both countries, disappearances were intensively used in the first two or 
three years after the military coups; after this, their use declined or even ceased.  
 
Graph 1: Timing of Disappearances in Chile and Argentina 
 
Note: The graph draws on the Report of CONADEP (National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons) and the final Report of the Chilean National Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation. 
 
 
The Pinochet regime disappeared more than a thousand of its citizens. Despite the 
setting up of a number of official bodies tasked to provide an authoritative account of the 
disappeared, the precise figure is still unknown. For example, the final report of the truth 
commission published in the early 1990s indicated 2,396 cases, 979 of which referred to 
disappearances, but a follow up commission focusing on the disappeared added another 
123 cases originally excluded (United Nations, 2013:paragraph 7). In ensuing truth 
recovery processes in 2009 (Valech Commission, II), another eight cases were included, 
raising the number of the disappeared to 1,110 persons (ibid). Approximately 3,000 
people were executed but they remain unaccounted for; therefore, in legal terms, they are 
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still missing. The ‘politics of measurement’ of sensitive human rights questions is a 
pivotal but thorny issue (Brysk, 1994:676). 
The chronological distribution of disappearances is crucial to a grasp of the 
repertoire of repression in Chile. Most disappearances (95%) occurred between 1973 and 
1976. Broadly defined, there were two periods of disappearances. The first wave took 
place in the immediate aftermath of the coup in September 1973 and lasted until late 
1974. In this period, the secret police (DINA) targeted militants of the Revolutionary Left 
Movement (MIR) in an effort to eradicate the leftist resistance. It is estimated that in the 
first three months following the coup, 631 persons disappeared, accounting for more than 
half of the total missing (Ballesteros, 1995:48). The majority of disappeared of the period 
were MIR militants; they were executed and their bodies ditched to hide incriminatory 
evidence. In the second period of repression, from 1975 to 1978, disappearances became 
a more sophisticated tool of terror; the selection of victims was based on intelligence 
gathered by DINA, and the extraction of information was facilitated by clandestine 
detention centers. During this period, repression was directed at a broader circle of 
students, workers, and communist and socialist sympathizers7.  
 Argentina’s temporal distribution of disappearances is a mirror image. The 
majority of the disappearances took place in the first couple of years after the 1976 coup. 
Most victims were members of, or sympathizers with, leftist or Peronist militant groups 
or members of labor, trade, or student unions. Interestingly, disappearances in Argentina 
were already taking place before the military coup,8 but after 1976, they were carried out 
on a massive scale, quickly becoming the central tool of repression (Robben, 2005). As 
part of a ‘national security doctrine,’ the ideological foundation for the ‘Dirty War’ in the 
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region, disappearances became the most effective counterinsurgency mechanism 
(Armony, 2005; McSherry, 2002). 
After 1978, the number of disappearances dropped. In fact, a common thread 
linking the two countries’ experiences is that disappearances were used on a large scale 
only in the first period of repression. From the standpoint of the military dictatorships in 
Chile and Argentina, there were several strategic advantages to the use of disappearances 
immediately after the coup. For one thing, the immediate objective of any coup is to 
establish a firm grip on state and society, and disappearances can be a useful way to 
achieve this goal. As the comparative experience of Argentina and Chile shows, 
disappearances can eliminate (or at least radically diminish) potential resistance. As 
opposed to other indiscriminate tools of terror, which could turn even sympathizers 
against a regime, this selective form of violence can be used against specific individuals 
or groups. Tellingly, the majority of the victims in Chile and Argentina were young, 
educated members of trade/labor unions or student associations. As part of the bid to 
remove resistance, disappearances were used to extract intelligence. A Chilean general 
later confessed, ‘There was a lot of people who wanted us to kill all the Marxists, but 
DINA’s task wasn’t to kill them….It was intelligence, to check all the information and 
then go look for the bandits’ (Payne, 2007:113). Of course, execution followed the 
acquisition of intelligence on potential threats to the regime. 
 In addition, disappearances have a unique psychological impact on the broader 
society. By disappearing the dead bodies of the victims and making it impossible, or at 
the very least extremely difficult, to prove that a crime was committed, the Chilean 
regime could instill terror not merely in potential ‘subversives’ but in society at large. 
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The terror accompanying the widespread disappearances essentially demobilized society, 
making it easier to control people in the turbulent period after the coups. 
 On the one hand, disappearances have strategic value in the early stages of 
authoritarian rule. On the other hand, a policy of disappearances requires a high level of 
coordination among different branches of the state, infrastructures, trained agents, and 
intelligence. A policy of systematic disappearances is a time and resource-consuming 
enterprise, arguably requiring years of state control. This explains why disappearances as 
a form of state violence are more likely to be used by the military, an institution with a 
nationally based infrastructure, and with the capacity and training to carry out such a 
demanding and large scale operations in a short period. Chile and Argentina are cases in 
point. To some extent, thus, apart from the external factors, discussed above, there is also 
a domestic dimension in selecting disappearances as a tool of repression. According to 
the Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, the 
‘deniability’ of disappearances made the crime more appealing to the military, as they 
hoped to avoid strong objections from other sectors of the state or even the army itself.9 
Despite their efficacy, disappearances were used for a relatively short time in 
Chile and Argentina – only in the early years after the respective coups. Even the military 
leaders made concrete efforts to put an end to this period. DINA, the central organization 
carrying out disappearances in Chile, was shut down in 1977 and was replaced by CNI 
(Central Nacional de Informaciones). Similarly, the Argentine military leaders, in an 
effort to draw a clear line between the present (stable) situation and past practices, passed 
a ‘law on disappearances’ in 1979, institutionalizing the presumption of death.10 In other 
words, what we see in Chile and Argentina is that as time passed and authoritarian 
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leaders were more effectively controlling state and society, their priorities shifted towards 
consolidating their power. They began to emphasize the creation of institutions to 
legitimize their authoritarian rule, not to continue violence (Gandhi and Przeworski, 
2007).  
 While strategic benefits explain the timing of the Chilean and Argentinian 
disappearances, other factors may have ‘pushed’ the dictators in this direction; for 
example, as mentioned previously, the fear of future (legal) accountability or 
international scrutiny may have been a factor (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Ramos, Ron and 
Thoms, 2007). One of the most important, yet least explored, considerations of military 
leaders in the design of their repertoires of repression is accountability (DeMeritt, Conrad 
and Fariss, 2014). Although the clandestine nature of the crime of disappearance inhibits 
our efforts to substantiate this argument with rich empirical evidence, it seems that 
prospective accountability, particularly punitive, was a key consideration in the region. 
Antonius Robben points out:  
The disappearance of the corpses was motivated by a strategic concern about the 
political future of the armed forces. Eventually the military would have to hand 
power to a democratic government and they knew that without a corpus delicti 
future criminal prosecutions would be impossible (Robben, 2000:94). 
As opposed to other available types of repression, which leave incriminatory 
evidence, the military could simply deny the commission of the crime. Chilean Osvaldo 
Romo, a DINA civilian agent, one of the masterminds of disappearances, admitted: 
‘When you don’t have [bodies in] cemeteries, you don’t have anything, you just have to 
throw them into the sea’ (Payne, 2007:111). He also mentioned disguising the identity of 
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the dead bodies by snapping off their fingers and toes with bolt cutters to remove any 
incriminatory evidence (ibid). By disappearing their enemies, perpetrators could distance 
themselves from the crime, as there was no corpus delicti/body of evidence. In an 
influential report, Amnesty International explains why disappearances represent the 
‘prefect crime’: ‘If there is no prisoner, no body, no victim, then presumably no one can 
be accused of having done anything’ (Amnesty International, 1981:91)  
Moreover, the practice of disappearances removes the individual from the realm 
of law. General Contreras, the main organizer of tortures in Chile, reinforced this point 
when he said: ‘I have never acknowledged that there were human rights violations during 
the military government, not in my case, nor by my people. We acted under the law’ 
(Payne, 2007:147). As Ron rightly argues, and as Contreras’ comment demonstrates, 
‘Repressive states cloak their activities in a mantle of pseudolegality that channels their 
techniques of repression into ways that appear, at least to the outside observer, to follow 
legitimate patterns of violence’ (Ron, 1997: 298). 
The military cannot be certain a coup will be successful and will lead to their 
consolidation, nor can they predict how long their reign will last. Given the uncertainty, 
prospective accountability becomes a concern, making disappearances an attractive 
option, largely because of their deniability, should prosecutions occur at some point in 
the future. As noted above, one of the ‘unintended consequences’ of the growing 
international media and policy attention on human rights violations (DeMeritt, Conrad 
and Fariss, 2014) was that it could push dictators to deploy clandestine tools of 
repression, such as disappearances, something particularly important for regimes whose 
survival depends on international support or tolerance, such as Argentina. Also noted 
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above, the international reaction to the public executions in the first weeks after the coup 
in Chile could well have been a push factor in Argentina’s preference for clandestine 
violence. However, the (eventual) international visibility of their crimes led both military 
dictatorships to pass amnesty laws before ceding power to civilians. Their concern about 
the prospect of future accountability was obvious.  
Although it was initially difficult for human rights watchdogs or international 
diplomatic missions to identify acts of disappearances in Latin America, as time passed, 
they established screening mechanisms that enabled them to document patterns of crimes. 
Stefanie Grant remembers how the deniability of the crime inhibited their efforts: 
Amnesty had to decide whether disappearances was a category the organization 
should take up, and if so, who were the disappeared, and what could be done. At 
the simplest level it was a question how you fitted this situation of absence into an 
organization whose work had been framed by individuals held in a named prison, 
or being tortured in a particular place. It is methodologically straightforward 
where a person is in this prison or detention center, you know where they are, and 
your job is to get them out. But where the person is defined not by their presence 
in a prison camp or in a torture center but by their absence, the task is much 
harder. 11 
Despite the difficulties, their efforts bore fruit, and after the first two years, the practice 
abated in both countries.  
In the end, although disappearances were seen as the perfect crime, they came 
back to haunt the perpetrators. In the decades since the transitions in Chile and Argentina, 
many military leaders have been indicted or convicted on charges related to abductions 
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and disappearances. In addition, the mobilization of the relatives of victims in both 
countries remains a point of reference for the contemporary human rights movement 
(Kovras, 2017).  
The most recent developments in international accountability norms have 
contributed to a decrease in the incidence of this crime worldwide by explicitly 
legislating against it. As the following table shows, there have been crucial advances in 
the criminalization of forced disappearances.  
 
 
 
The improvement of the international scrutiny of authoritarian regimes is another 
factor driving this trend. Both tendencies seem to draw on a narrow definition of 
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disappearances in war scenarios, much more difficult to scrutinize and less affected by 
international norms. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper builds on the important work of Berman and Clark (1982) and Clark (2001) 
and expands it by providing an explanation of the emergence and timing of systematic 
disappearances as a deliberate repressive strategy in the hands of certain regimes. To do 
so, it takes a closer look at Greece, Chile, and Argentina.  
What happened in Greece taught later repressive regimes that the type of crimes 
they perpetrated might eventually matter. Therefore, after their respective coups, both 
Chile and Argentina chose the strategy of disappearances over other available tools.12 In a 
way, the improved legal framework that caught the Greek colonels flat-footed made 
disappearances the ideal tool of subsequent state terror. The clandestine and extrajudicial 
nature made it extremely difficult to trace the crime’s commission. Without a body, there 
was no incriminatory evidence, thereby minimizing (but not eliminating) the possibility 
of future criminal prosecution and international scrutiny. And it inspired fear among the 
general populace. That being said, its utility ended in both countries in a few years’ time, 
once state institutions were set in place and international watchdogs began to close in.  
The discussion sheds light on the dialectical relationship between the ‘logic of 
violence’ and the ‘logic of the law,’ something important for the study of international 
(accountability) norms. A number of studies have enumerated the growing human rights 
prosecutions in post-conflict and post-authoritarian settings, a phenomenon known as the 
‘justice cascade’ (Sikkink, 2011), but the lion’s share of academic attention has been 
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reserved for the long-term positive impact of accountability norms on the post-
transitional trajectory of individual countries, including respect for human rights. While 
we find this research convincing, we point to the short and medium-term unintended 
consequences of post-WWII normative developments, which have occasionally ‘pushed’ 
authoritarian leaders – particularly military ones, as in the case of Chile and Argentina - 
to deploy extrajudicial and clandestine forms of repression. At the same time, we invite 
scholars to pay more attention to the unintended and/or unforeseen consequences of 
socio-political actions, something largely overlooked in the literature on the development 
of the international human rights regime.  
Admittedly, the whole issue of disappearances requires further research. With 
growing democratization, the improved international scrutiny of authoritarian regimes by 
human rights associations and organizations, and the gradual development of a robust and 
specific legal framework, disappearances have declined over the past 20 years, at least in 
peace settings. An increasingly assertive global civil society has contributed to improve 
the standards of accountability and real improvements in human rights outcomes have 
taken place over time (Fariss, 2014). In the past, it was difficult to monitor state abuses in 
real time. But disappearances are harder to conceal now, not only because of the existing 
international legal framework, but also because a robust and interconnected civil society 
is permanently watching.  
That being said, the logic of violence recently found a legal loophole and took this 
dialectical relationship a step further. The emergence of a novel form of disappearances, 
‘extraordinary rendition’ (Kyriakou, 2012), is reflected in the evolution of the 
International Criminal Court’s (ICC) definition of disappearances and the disappeared, 
	 26 
whereby the ‘Perpetrator intended to remove such persons or persons from the protection 
of the law for a prolonged period of time’ (see International Criminal Court Statute, 
article 7, 2(i); Silva, 2008:329).13 As ‘prolonged period’ is vague, it gives states the 
opportunity to interrogate or torture suspected terrorists in an extrajudicial fashion. The 
implicit struggle between the ‘logic of consequences’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ is 
an important consideration in international politics and should be examined in greater 
depth. The crime of ‘extraordinary rendition’ is an alarming reminder that not only 
autocracies, but also democracies, engage in repressive strategies to conceal their crimes 
and avoid international scrutiny.  
 Following from the above, we wish to highlight a broader disciplinary flaw in the 
study of political repression and human rights. On the one hand, political scientists, 
guided by a ‘logic of consequences,’ focus on the structural, rational, or cultural factors 
shaping the repertoire of repression. On the other hand, most legal scholars, following the 
‘logic of appropriateness,’ focus on the application of the law irrespective of the political 
conditions, paying limited attention to the prevalence of violence in times of repression. 
The ‘logic of appropriateness’ sees legal responses to violence as the only appropriate 
response, thereby delimiting introspection or critical reflection on the unintended 
consequences of legal developments. As normative (‘push’) factors could be important 
influences on the repertoire of violent repression by precluding certain tools, more 
interdisciplinary research is most certainly required.  
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1 A famous precedent is the ‘Night and Fog’ (Nacht und Nebel) operation inspired by a 1941 Nazi decree 
aimed at the Resistance movement in Western Europe. This decree explicitly stated that no information 
should be given to the families about the whereabouts or fate of the prisoners, who must vanish without a 
trace. In addition, during World War II, secretly executed victims were buried in mass graves; a notorious 
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case is the Katyn massacre. Yet the primary objective of the first case was to inflict terror and uncertainty 
in newly annexed territories, whereas the second represented an attempt to deflect political responsibility. 
In other words, diverse motives are at play when mostly but not only authoritarian regimes choose 
disappearances as a repressive strategy.  
2 Even though this was a crucial precedent, very little happened in terms of international criminal 
prosecution between the immediate post war period and 1993, when the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia was established. Until the early 1990s, international human rights law developed 
largely in isolation from either international criminal law or international humanitarian law. There was 
some development of International Human Rights Law at the level of adoption of conventions, but this 
rarely extended to their practical enforcement and certainly not to criminal prosecution.	
3 Stefanie Grant, interviewed by Iosif Kovras in London, UK, in 19 January 2015. 
4 The concept of ‘unintended consequences’ dates back in time, but sociologist Robert K. Merton was the 
first to widely disseminate it.  
5 Much later, another relevant French military officer recognized in an interview published by Le Monde, 
among other atrocities, the “disappearance” of enemies in the Battle of Algiers (“Les aveux du général 
Aussaresses : "Je me suis résolu à la torture"”, 23 November 2000). This General also provided information 
about the commission of barbarisms in this battle in his memories (Aussaresses, 2001) and in the 
documentary by Marie-Monique Robin ‘Escadrons de la mort, l'école française’ (2003). After the Battle of 
Algieres, Aussaresses was instructor of US special military forces. Afterwards, he also collaborated 
actively with the Brazilian dictatorship (more information in https://apublica.org/2014/04/um-torturador-
frances-na-ditadura-brasileira/). 	6	The School was located in Panama.  
7	There was also an exceptional case of 5 members of the FPMR (Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez) that 
were killed and disappeared in 1987 by the CNI (Central Nacional de Informaciones).	
8 An important nuance should be noted: disappearances did not occur in Chile during the democratic 
government of Salvador Allende, while in Argentina, disappearances occurred during the brief dictatorship 
of Alejandro Agustín Lanusse in the early 1970s and during the various democratic governments between 
1973 and 1976.	
9 According to this Report, beyond ‘the primary motivation of eliminating the enemy (…), the use of 
disappearance accomplished other objectives (…); it allowed the government and security services to avoid 
having to accept responsibility for their actions. In particular it saved them from having to deal with the 
legal actions and other pressures and “misunderstandings” that might have been created in Chile and 
elsewhere and even among the members of the armed forces themselves, if they had acknowledged having 
arrested and then executed so many people, rather than arresting and killing them secretly’ (English 
translation of the Report by the University of Notre Dame, 1993; Part 2, p.497). We are very grateful to 
Stefanie Grant for bringing this point to our attention. 
10 Disappearances continued after 1979, although on a much smaller scale. The principal reason for the 
presumption of death law was the visit of a delegation of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights in September 1979 to investigate the disappearances. This shows that pressure from human rights 
organizations also explains the military abandonment of enforced disappearances as a tool of political 
terror.	
11 Stefanie Grant, Interviewed by Iosif Kovras in London, UK, in 19 January 2015. 
12	In fact, when the Argentine military junta took power, the trials and convictions of the leaders of the 
Greek military junta had already taken place.	
13 It should be noted that the definition of enforced disappearance by the Rome Statute marks a point of 
departure from the Convention, as it places the individual outside the protection of the law and is 
considered a consequence rather than a constitutive feature of the crime.		
